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Foreign Investment Restrictions as Industrial Policy:
The Case of Canadian Telecommunications
Robert W. Crandall† and Hal J. Singer‡

We assess the economic harms that would accrue if
Canada were to adopt asymmetric rules of foreign ownership for incumbent carriers and entrants. We explain
the current Canadian regulatory climate surrounding
foreign investment in Canadian telecommunications.
Competition in the telecommunications industry is generally robust, which suggests that rules aimed at
favouring entrants are not necessary. Moreover, Canadian entrants are equally capable of attracting foreign
capital as Canadian incumbents, which suggests that foreign investment rules aimed at favouring entrants are
especially unwise.

to develop across different platforms — cable, wireline,
and wireless — not among small niche players lured into
the marketplace by regulators.
With the lessons of the U.S. regulatory experience in
mind, we review two specific Canadian proposals
regarding foreign investment rules: tiering and licensing.
We conclude that a tiering approach would harm competition and infrastructure investment because it would
reduce the incentives of incumbent carriers to invest in
network upgrades or new services, and potentially aggravate the problem of excess capacity that plagues the
telecommunications industry. A licensing approach for
foreign investment restrictions should also be rejected.
Licensing would impose a further layer of regulation on
the marketplace, reduce foreign investment, and expose
foreign carriers to political pressures. The Canadian
agencies should not follow their southern neighbours
down the road to despair.

Next, we review the U.S. attempt to stimulate competition in local telecommunications markets through
an analogous form of asymmetrical regulation. Despite
the best of intentions, United States regulators have not
been able to stimulate meaningful local competition
through such asymmetrical regulation. Moreover, the
resultant easy access to capital created wasteful investment by the entrants. Second, licensing restrictions on
foreign carriers in the U.S. reflect another form of asymmetric regulation because they apply only to wireless
licenses, not wireline operations. This licensing process
confers substantial discretionary authority on the FCC,
which has allowed the process to become highly
politicized. Finally, asymmetric rules for broadband services have cemented the position of cable modem providers vis-à-vis DSL providers.

I. Introduction

I

ndustry Canada has proposed a re-examination of
Canada’s foreign investment restrictions that apply to
the telecommunications sector because it fears that these
restrictions are leading to under-investment in the Canadian telecommunications sector. 1 Industry Canada has
thus issued a number of questions to establish a dialogue
about alternatives to the current foreign investment
restrictions. Among the alternatives being considered are
proposals to relax these investment restrictions for new
entrants or for smaller companies, while leaving the
restrictions in place for the established incumbent carriers. 2 As an alternative or complementary policy, it is
examining the possibility of a new licensing regime for
foreign investment in telecommunications that would
allow the government to decide on the admissibility of
foreign capital on a case-by-case basis. 3

The U.S. experience highlights several issues that
may be relevant for Industry Canada as it assesses the
effect of changes in foreign ownership rules on competition in telecommunications. In particular, the investment of more than $40 billion by entrants in the U.S.
local telecommunications markets has been almost completely squandered. This asymmetric regulation did not
succeed in attracting entrants that would have a measurable effect on the retail price of telecommunications
services. Given the nature of demand for and supply of
telecommunications services, competition is more likely
†Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution.
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Canada thus proposes two types of asymmetric regulation: one in which firms are regulated differently, and
another in which investors are regulated differently.
There is no clear academic consensus on the merits of
either form of asymmetric regulation. A number of
authors have suggested that asymmetric regulation by
firm type fosters growth in the telecommunications
industry. Thomas Kiessling and Yves Blondeel assert that
asymmetric regulation of incumbents can lead to net
efficiency gains by countering the structural market
advantages of those incumbents, provided that entrants
are facilities-based. 4 Yuntsai Chou and Kung-Chung Liu
argue that the asymmetric regulation of carriers based on
incumbency and platform in Taiwan played a large role
in the more than ten-fold increase in Taiwan’s mobile
penetration rate between 1997 and 2000. 5 Numerous
authors, however, point out that there is a large danger
that asymmetric regulation will distort the competitive
environment. 6
Academic opinion of the asymmetric regulation of
foreign investment tends to be somewhat more resolute.
Woo-Sik Moon and Yeong-Seop Rhee argue that the
asymmetric regulation of capital flows in Korea was one
of the ‘‘most important policy mistakes that caused the
accumulation of external and internal vulnerability and
triggered the currency crisis’’. 7 Carsten Fink, Aaditya
Mattoo, and Randeep Rathindran argue that ‘‘it is not
easy to find a sound rationale’’ for the existence of foreign ownership requirements, but observe that there is
not a sufficient analytical or empirical foundation for the
evaluation of the costs and benefits of ownership restrictions. 8 In this paper, we aim to provide such a foundation, as it applies to actions proposed by Industry
Canada, through an examination of the U.S. experience
with asymmetric regulation.
To the extent that Industry Canada’s current concerns about the lack of investment in Canadian telecommunications are derived from a comparison of U.S. and
Canadian capital expenditures in this sector since the
passage of the U.S. Telecommunications Act, those concerns are misplaced. 9 It is now apparent that much of the
U.S. capital spending near the end of the last decade was
driven by a speculative bubble, and that billions of dollars were wasted on ill-advised new entry into local telecommunications and capacity expansion in transmission. Most of the carriers who made these investments
are now either bankrupt or in serious financial difficulty.
Industry Canada should not induce entry from a larger
number of participants than the demand for telecommunications services is capable of sustaining. It is better
to leave these fundamental choices to the market. In this
article, we show that attempting to guide economic
resources to favoured groups of companies, whether by
relaxing foreign capital restrictions or by other regulatory
programs, is a serious mistake that results in substantial
waste.
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In Part II of this article, we explain the current Canadian regulatory climate surrounding foreign investment
in Canadian telecommunications. We also describe the
state of competition and foreign investment in Canadian
telecommunications. Competition in the telecommunications industry is robust, which suggests that rules
aimed at favouring entrants in general might not be
necessary. Moreover, Canadian entrants are equally
capable of attracting foreign capital as Canadian incumbents, which suggests that foreign investment rules
aimed at favouring entrants are especially unwise.
In Part III of this article, we describe privileged
classes of carriers identified by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in local exchange (competitive carriers), wireless services (designated entities),
broadband Internet access (cable modem providers), and
international telecommunications (wireline providers).
We examine the nature of the asymmetric regulation in
each of those sectors and provide a qualitative analysis of
the cost of skewing the regulatory landscape.
In Part IV, we apply the lessons of the U.S. experience to the Canadian situation. The proposals advanced
by Industry Canada would place restrictions on a select
group of participants in the telecommunications marketplace. In predominantly privatized markets such as
Canadian telecommunications, such a tiered approach
presents several problems. Such an approach would
reduce the incentives for incumbent carriers to invest in
new facilities; if shareholders perceived that the restricted
companies were at a competitive disadvantage, tiering
could lower the restricted companies’ share prices, and
therefore, actually increase the cost of capital. Tiering
would also risk replicating the problem of excess
capacity that now plagues the U.S. telecommunications
industry. Moreover, because Canada’s facilities-based carriers differ in several dimensions, such as revenue,
market capitalization, and the technology used, tiering
would be difficult to implement. Licensing is equally
flawed because it would create new uncertainty for carriers, which would likely reduce investment in Canada’s
telecommunications network. If licensing were conditioned on, for instance, a head office in Canada or investment of a certain amount each year in rural broadband
deployment, then foreign investors would look for alternative (non-Canadian) investment outlets.
The form of asymmetric regulation of foreign
investment contemplated by Industry Canada has failed
to achieve its purported objectives in the United States,
Australia, or Korea. Extending preferences to a particular
class of competitors is not likely to alter the long-term
equilibrium market structure if those companies are not
viable. The factors that influence that equilibrium —
economies of scale and scope, demographics, and market
technologies — are likely to be much more important
than differential access to foreign capital in relatively
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large, wealthy countries, such as Canada. The persistent
failure of policies in other countries that have targeted
certain classes of competitors should serve as a warning
to Canada as it contemplates making foreign capital
more readily available to new entrants.

II. Foreign Investment in Canadian
Telecommunications

F

oreign investment in Canadian telecommunications
carriers is currently restricted. Foreign ownership in
a holding company that owns telecommunications operations is not permitted to exceed 46.7 per cent. 10 The
restriction applies equally to incumbents and new
entrants, and it is among the most stringent of all Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries. Canada’s Standing Committee on
Industry, Science and Technology recommended that
the Government of Canada ‘‘entirely remove the existing
minimum Canadian ownership requirements’’. 11 In a
letter to Walt Lastewka, Chair of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Minister of
Industry Allan Rock agreed with the Committee’s suggestion to pursue the removal of foreign ownership
restrictions in a symmetric manner:
You concluded that symmetrical removal of restrictions for
telecommunications carriers and BDUs, which compete
with similar services in the same markets, is the best way of
achieving the objectives of both the Telecommunications
Act and the Broadcasting Act. The government accepts this
reasoning, which reinforces that in order to promote competition and regulate the industry in a smart, stable and
efficient manner, it would be irresponsible to move asymmetrically. 12

In this article, we explain that the attitude towards
asymmetric regulation expressed by Minister Rock is the
correct one. 13 Although it appears that Canada will chart
the correct course with respect to asymmetric regulation,
the possibility of asymmetric regulation has not yet been
fully laid to rest. Our examination of the shortcomings of
asymmetric regulation in the United States is intended
as a cautionary lesson against reversing course and
imposing asymmetric foreign investment regulations on
incumbents and entrants.

The State of Competition in Canadian
Telecommunications
Telecommunications competition is developing
steadily under the present system of symmetric foreign
investment rules. Canada’s commitment to telecommunications has resulted in a secure infrastructure, affordable and high-quality service, significant innovation, considerable broadband penetration, and vibrant
competition. The OECD’s 2002 Review of Regulatory
Reform in Canada finds that ‘‘low prices, good quality
service and relatively rapid diffusion of new technologies
characterize the Canadian telecommunications landscape’’. 14 Indeed, the average prices for business and resi-
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dential telecommunications services are lower than the
corresponding averages in the United States and
OECD. 15
All telecommunications sectors in the Canadian
economy are open to competition. Although new
entrants account for a smaller share of access lines in
Canada than in the United States, competition for the
local market in Canada is gaining strength. The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) is an independent regulator, whose policies to date have created an effective regulatory
environment. The OECD has praised Canada for
‘‘having a relatively better regulatory process’’ than many
other OECD countries, particularly as it relates to the
interface between incumbents and competitors. 16
Because it does not create artificial incentives for
resale, Canada’s competition model encourages sustainable facilities-based competition. There exists inter-platform competition between wireline, cable, and wireless
technologies. Competition in Canadian data and private
line services has earned those sectors of the Canadian
telecommunications industry significant regulatory forbearance. Similarly, competition among facilities-based
long distance carriers has led to lower prices and has
freed incumbents of rate regulation. Telus and Bell
Canada, the large incumbent local carriers in BC–Alberta
and Ontario–Quebec, respectively, are expending considerable resources to enter one another’s geographical
markets with services aimed predominantly at business
customers. To be fair, two of Canada’s five national network providers were reorganizing under bankruptcy
protection as of April 2003, but those carriers quickly
emerged from such protection over the next few
months. The bankruptcies highlight the delicate tradeoff
that regulators face between intense competition and
long-term industry stability.
Finally, intra- and inter-platform competition
between companies offering cable and digital subscriber
line (DSL) has fostered growth in high-speed data access
market. Indeed, as of the end of 2002, Canada’s business
broadband penetration was second only to Korea among
OECD nations, and 85 per cent of Canadians lived in
communities with access to high-speed broadband service. 17
The provision of local services in Canada offers no
exception to the competitive successes found elsewhere
in the Canadian telecommunications industry. The
CRTC has taken particular pains to enhance entrants’
prospects for success by mandating number portability,
unbundled local loops, co-location, and interconnection,
and by implementing other regulatory safeguards. In
1998, competitive facilities-based local exchange carriers
began offering local services in Canada. By 2003, facilities-based competition from competitive local exchange
carriers (CLECs) was particularly intense in urban business markets. 18 Entrants such as FCI Broadband, Primus,
and 360 Networks are competing aggressively with
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Telus and Bell Canada. CLECs are not expected to make
substantial inroads with respect to residential wireline
service, in large part because the incumbent local
exchange carriers’ (ILECs) very low prices reflect their
efficiency in providing such service. These prices are so
low that entrants have difficulty in matching them.
Although industry experts anticipate that CLECs
will have a somewhat limited role in the provision of
residential telecommunications services, residential consumers are benefiting from growing platform competition. Canadian telecommunications consumers are demonstrating an increasing willingness to substitute wireless
service for not only secondary, but also primary lines.
Finally, cable operators have begun to offer telephone
service in eastern Canada, and have achieved market
shares of as high as 30 per cent in some local markets.
Canada’s high degree of cable penetration provides a
solid base for the continued deployment of cable
telephony.

The State of Foreign Investment in
Canadian Telecommunications
Canada’s current regulatory climate is producing
desirable investment results in the telecommunications
sector, despite an adverse global investing climate for the
sector. Table 1 demonstrates that Canada increased its
investment per capita at a time when investment
declined in most other markets.

Table 1: Change in Telecommunications:
Investment Per Capita, 2000-2001

Country

tive to the capital expenditures of the major Canadian
carriers.

Figure 1: Capital Expenditure Index: Large
Incumbents in the United States and Canada
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22%
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0%

Australia

-14%
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-16%

Germany

-17%

Japan
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United States

-21%

Korea

-38%

Source: OECD, Draft Communications Outlook 2003,
Chapter 4.

Similarly, Figure 1 demonstrates that, since 2000,
the capital expenditures of the major U.S. incumbent
local exchange carriers have declined substantially rela-

2002E

2001

2003E

Source: OECD, Draft Communications Outlook 2003,
Chapter 4.

As Figure 1 shows, the capital expenditures of Telus
and Bell Canada remained constant throughout the
piercing of the telecommunications bubble, while investment by U.S. ILECs declined significantly.
The degree of foreign ownership of Canadian telecommunications carriers is relatively consistent across
both incumbents and new entrants. Tables 2 and 3
depict the shares of foreign ownership in Canadian wireline and wireless operators, respectively.

Table 2: Shares of Foreign Ownership in Canadian
Wireline Operators

Change in Investment
Per Capita

Canada

68% - Verizon
61% - Bell South
57% - SBC

BCE
Bell Canada
TELUS
AT&T Canada*
Call-Net
GT Group Telecom

1998
10.5%
10.5%
26.7%
33.3%
25.0%
25.6%

1999
6.6%
25.3%
26.7%
46.7%
25.0%
25.6%

2000
14.2%
31.4%
30.1%
46.7%
25.0%
25.0%

2001 2002
11.1% 14.1%
28.9% 14.1%
26.7%
46.7%
25.0%
25.0%

Note: Bell Canada foreign ownership includes any direct
stake in the operating company (for example, within the
20 per cent limit) plus any indirect stake held through BCE
as a holding company. AT&T Canada has been reorganized
as a Canadian company and renamed ‘‘Allstream’’. AT&T
(the U.S. company) has sold all of its shares in the company.
Source: BCE Financial Reports, LYA International, Foreign
Ownership of the Canadian Telecom Industry,
24 (2002).
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Table 3: Shares of Foreign Ownership in Canadian
Wireless Operators

Bell Mobility
TELUS Mobility
Rogers AT&T
Wireless
Clearnet
Microcell

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
10.5% 25.3% 31.4% 28.9% 14.1%
26.7% 26.7% 30.1% 26.7%
0.0% 16.1% 31.0% 31.1%
37.5% 34.1% 26.7% N/A
25.2% 26.4% 23.3% 26.4%

Notes: Bell Canada foreign ownership includes any direct
stake in the operating company (for example, within the
20 per cent limit) plus any indirect stake held through BCE
as a holding company. Ownership shares are reported at the
firm-wide level, so the shares of Bell Mobility are the same as
those of BCE and those of TELUS Mobility are the same as
TELUS.
Source: BCE Financial Reports, LYA International, Foreign
Ownership of the Canadian Telecom Industry, 24
(2002).

Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that Canadian entrants have
been as successful as Canadian incumbents in attracting
foreign investment. Because there is no noticeable discrepancy in the attractiveness of Canadian telecommunications carriers to foreign investors on the basis of
incumbency, Canada should not impose asymmetric
regulations on foreign ownership. In the next section, we
demonstrate how similar attempts to skew the playing
field in favour of entrants have failed in the United
States.

III. The Failure of Asymmetric
Regulation of Telecommunications
in the United States

T

he recent experience of the United States illustrates
the dangers of asymmetric regulation. Given its geographic proximity and similar socio-economic composition, the consequences of regulatory action in the United
States are a good predictor for the consequences of similar regulatory action in Canada. The United States’s
failed foray into asymmetric telecommunications regulation highlights the wisdom of the Department of
Industry’s intention to pursue symmetric regulation and
supplies a potent example of the potential damage to
Canada’s telecommunications sector from abandoning
that course.
In the United States, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has tried repeatedly to inject competition into various sectors by establishing rules that apply
only to a special class of competitors. In earlier years, for
example, it barred the television networks from having
‘‘financial interests’’ in programming so as to promote
the development of new, independent sources of programming. It also limited the number of hours of programming that the networks could offer during prime
time to reduce network influence over viewer choices.
Both initiatives were failures, redounding to the benefit
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of motion-picture companies and low-budget gameshow promoters. 19
More recently, under the new 1996 Telecommunications Act, the FCC has provided CLECs with access to
the incumbent carriers’ networks at regulated wholesale
rates. Facilities-based CLECs are not subject to the same
unbundling provisions. The United States also imposes
asymmetric rules on foreign investment in U.S. telecommunications companies, limiting foreign ownership of
companies with wireless facilities to 25 per cent, but
imposing no such restrictions on companies that only
have wire-based facilities. In the wireless service industry,
the FCC has provided small companies (classified as
‘‘designated entities’’) with bidding credits or special
access to spectrum auctions — a policy that has resulted
in billions of dollars of auction proceeds not being collected.
The U.S. broadband Internet access market provides
a final example of asymmetric regulation by the FCC.
Due to the nature of U.S. communications laws, the
services of cable modem providers are exempt from the
regulations that govern the provision of DSL service —
despite the fact that cable modems account for about
two-thirds of all U.S. broadband Internet access subscribers. 20

Asymmetric Rules for Local Exchange
Carriers
The 1996 Telecommunications Act requires the
FCC to stimulate competition in local exchange services
by creating a privileged class of carriers, known as competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), and to provide
those carriers with preferential access to incumbents’
facilities. In this section, we review the associated cost of
this policy, especially with respect to the misallocation of
resources by the CLECs and the investment community.
The Nature of the Asymmetry
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the
FCC to identify network facilities of ILECs that should
be made available to entrants at regulated wholesale
rates. 21 The FCC liberally interpreted this mandate by
ruling that virtually every element of the ILECs’ networks — from loops to switches to collocation cages —
be made available at forward-looking, long-run average
incremental costs (LRAIC) to competitors. 22 The scope of
the unbundled network elements (UNEs) that the FCC
deemed essential was later found by the courts to be
excessive by any reasonable test. 23 According to the FCC,
failure to obtain virtually any network element, even
those supplied by other parties at competitive rates,
would impair a CLEC’s ability to compete effectively
and therefore should be supplied by the incumbents at
regulated rates. Moreover, because LRAIC rates are based
on the costs that a perfectly efficient network would
incur, the FCC determined that LRAIC rates should be

24
less than the actual historical costs of building and maintaining the ILECs’ networks.
The FCC’s unbundling rules have undergone periodic reviews and court reversals, but they remain in
place. 24 These rules are asymmetric in the sense that
facilities-based CLECs and cable telephony operators
that offer services identical to those provided by a given
ILEC are not subject to the same unbundling requirements. The reasoning behind this asymmetry is that the
imposition of unbundling on facilities-based entrants
would have the undesirable result of deterring an
entrant from investing in its own network.
The intended beneficiaries of the unbundling
regime were presumably consumers who, in theory,
would pay rates for telecommunications services that
approximated the average cost of providing those services. As it turns out, the beneficiaries of the plan were
some CLEC investors. In particular, CLECs accepted the
discounts and charged consumers prices that were just
below the end-user price charged by the incumbents.
With the most admirable intentions, the FCC created
little more than an arbitrage opportunity for knowledgeable investors who enjoyed influence in Washington.
The Cost of the Asymmetry
Despite access to a larger capital market, new
entrants in the United States have not created a market
that is likely to be more competitive in the long term
than that existing in Canada. Competition in local
exchange services is settling into platform competition
between incumbent carriers, cable companies that offer
voice telephony, and wireless providers. Most of the
entrants that relied on unbundling have failed. Only a
handful of the new local carriers are likely to survive,
particularly the facilities-based sellers of special access in
large metropolitan areas. Two large long distance companies, AT&T and MCI-WorldCom, are also attempting to
compete as resellers in this market.
The FCC’s attempt to induce competition artificially by creating a wholesale market in network facilities
with prices below actual costs has resulted in an enormous waste of resources. The subsidized access of new
CLECs to their larger, incumbent rivals’ facilities
enhanced their access to capital in the United States
from 1996 to 2001. The capital-spending boom is now
widely acknowledged to have created excess capacity in
data and voice transmission, 25 but the rise in investment
spread far beyond fibre-optic transmission facilities. Capital spending by the new local carriers increased from
virtually nothing to nearly $20 billion in 2000 alone. 26
Unfortunately, these new entrants did not develop
new services, and now the survivors are primarily subsisting by reselling incumbent services — that is, by
offering the local service delivered by the incumbents
through the so-called ‘‘UNE platform’’. Very few of the
survivors are likely to remain in the long term. The
publicly-traded CLECs were once the repository of more

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

than $80 billion in market capitalization and reported
more than $65 billion of spending on capital facilities
between 1996 and 2001. 27 Now those CLECs have a
scant $4 billion in total market capitalization. 28 As was
the case in the U.S. airlines and trucking industries two
decades ago, a large number of new entrants have foundered on bad business plans and a disappointing market.
The failure of the CLECs was magnified because of the
subsidies that lured so many new carriers into the marketplace, a feature lacking in the earlier exercises of airline and trucking deregulation.
The FCC’s unbundling rules discouraged CLECs
from investing in their own facilities. A CLEC will forgo
facilities-based investments so long as it has other opportunities that have higher net present value (NPV). Artificially low UNE prices induce CLECs to defer facilitiesbased investments because the NPV of UNE leasing is
higher than the NPV of investing in on-net assets. In
addition, because a CLEC can pick and choose from the
incumbents’ successful sunk investments, it pays for the
CLEC to ‘‘wait and see’’ how well other investments in
that sector have performed before committing itself to
investing its own capital. 29
In a paper co-authored with Dr. Allan Ingraham, we
found that the mis-pricing of UNE elements by the state
public utility commission (at the FCC’s direction) discouraged hundreds of millions of dollars from facilitiesbased investment. 30 By examining the variation in facilities-based investment in loops across U.S. states and
across states over time, we found that an increase in the
UNE loop rate increases CLEC facilities-based lines for
any reasonable own-price elasticity of demand for CLEC
service. We also found that facilities-based lines growth
relative to UNE growth was faster in states where the
cost of UNEs was higher relative to the cost of facilitiesbased investment. Hence, the best argument for maintaining the current unbundling regime — namely, that
low UNE rates encourage CLECs to rent at first, and
then build facilities once they have some market experience — is not supported by the data.
Because unbundling discouraged facilities-based
investment and the CLECs who availed themselves of
mis-priced UNEs did not leverage their customers into
stand-alone networks, the FCC’s attempt to ‘‘unlevel’’ the
playing field has been a notable failure. Such a lack of
success by the U.S. entrants should serve as a warning to
Industry Canada that asymmetric regulation is unlikely
to create an ‘‘ideal’’ number of competitors for Canada’s
telecommunications market. As of April 2003, two of
Canada’s five national network providers were reorganizing under bankruptcy protection and would emerge
from such protection over the next few months. These
bankruptcies suggest that Canada could suffer in the
near future from some of the same problems of excess
capacity that plague the United States. The economies of
scale and scope in telecommunications push the
industry towards a handful of suppliers, including cable
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companies, telephone companies, and wireless providers.
These companies compete vigorously with each other
and will compete more vigorously in the future. Industry
Canada should not induce a larger number of suppliers
than the demand for telecommunications services is
capable of sustaining. It is better to leave these fundamental choices to the market.

Asymmetric Rules for Foreign Carriers
Another form of asymmetric regulation in the
United States involves the FCC’s authority to deny (or
revoke) a wireless license to a corporation with indirect
foreign ownership exceeding 25 per cent 31 if the FCC
determines that such ownership is not in the public
interest. 32 This limitation on foreign investment imposes
significant costs on the industry and on American consumers.
The Nature of the Asymmetry
Section 310(b) of the U.S. Communications Act of
1934 grants the FCC discretionary authority to limit
foreign ownership of certain wireless communications
licenses to 25 per cent. 33 The rules are asymmetric
because carriers without radio-spectrum licenses, such as
pure wireline carriers, are not subject to the foreign ownership restrictions. 34 Although the disparate treatment of
wireline and wireless carriers may have been innocuous
at one time, the divisions between those services are
beginning to blur as consumers are increasingly substituting wireless telephones for landline connections. 35 As
wireless and wireline carriers compete in an increasingly
direct fashion, restrictions on wireless licensees will distort investment decisions of foreign investors across U.S.
telecommunications carriers. 36
Another asymmetry arises from the fact that the
FCC has interpreted the statutory language of section 310(b)(3) to mean that it has broad discretion in
determining what is in the public interest. 37 In fulfilling
that obligation, the FCC considers the following factors:
‘‘the extent of the foreign ownership or control of the
corporation; the passive nature of the licensed facility;
and whether the applicant was otherwise qualified’’. 38 If
a foreign government has an ownership interest in the
foreign investor, the acquiring firm must be reviewed
under the international settlements policy (ISP) ‘‘to prevent whipsawing by a foreign monopoly carrier’’. 39
Finally, the FCC looks at the economic relationship
between the United States and the foreign state. 40 If the
country allows foreigners access to its market, the FCC is
more likely to determine that the license transfer is in
the public interest. The inclusion of these inherently
subjective factors makes the regulation even more asymmetric in its application.
The Cost of the Asymmetry
The effect of these foreign restrictions in the United
States is evident in the complex and expensive corporate
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transactions needed to acquire capital, technical expertise, and technological upgrades from foreign investors.
For example, Rupert Murdoch, the chairman of Fox Television Network, faced such great expense in complying
with the strict limitations when building his network
that he decided to become a U.S. citizen so as to reduce
the regulatory burden. 41 The funds expended on compliance with this regulation could have been directed to
further upgrades in programming or the delivery of the
product to U.S. consumers or both. 42 A foreign investor
who sought to build or acquire a wireline telecommunications network, by contrast, would not incur those legal
and regulatory expenses. Hence, the asymmetry likely
distorts investment decisions of foreign carriers between
wireless and wireline acquisition targets.
The FCC’s discretion in waiving the ownership
restrictions creates additional costs by injecting uncertainty into investment decisions and driving away riskaverse investors. Moreover, the conditioning of U.S.
licenses on tests of the ‘‘public interest, convenience and
necessity’’ remains controversial in international trade
negotiations. 43 The FCC has been able to delay granting
licenses in response to political pressures, and has interpreted its powers broadly as a right to extract ex ante
concessions from foreign applicants before granting
licenses.

Asymmetric Rules for Carriers Bidding in
Spectrum Auctions
The FCC has also attempted to induce competition
in wireless services by creating a privileged class of carriers, known as designated entities (DEs). These entities
have been given preferential treatment in spectrum auctions, a policy that has created confusion and led to a
lengthy court battle. This policy has not improved wireless competition in the United States, but it has cost the
U.S. Treasury billions of dollars of lost auction revenues.
The Nature of the Asymmetry
Congress instructed the FCC to seek ways to
achieve diversity in the ownership of spectrum licenses. 44
With the best intentions, the FCC implemented several
complex auction systems that were exploited by sophisticated companies in FCC Auction #5, which began in
December 1995. First, the FCC set aside large swaths of
spectrum for DEs — that is, for carriers believed to be
too small to compete for this spectrum. 45 The FCC also
provided the DEs with bidding credits in these auctions,
which allowed them to purchase licenses at a fraction of
the cost that non-DEs were willing to pay. Finally, the
FCC offered generous financing plans to DEs that enabled them to defer payments on winning bids for up to
10 years.
Nextwave, a small company created for the purpose
of bidding on the set-aside spectrum, was one of the first
firms to take advantage of the FCC’s new program.
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Nextwave had a total of $4.2 billion in winning bids at
the conclusion of Auction #5. 46 Even though the winning bidders were allowed to defer their payments on
this spectrum over 10 years (and such DEs were obligated to make only interest payments for the first six
years), 47 Nextwave failed to make its scheduled payments on its licenses and entered bankruptcy. In
response, the FCC reclaimed the licenses and re-auctioned them in 2000.
The FCC again reserved certain portions of the
spectrum for ‘‘entrepreneurial’’ firms in a December
2000 re-auction of the Nextwave spectrum, Auction #35.
In particular, the FCC prevented the participation of any
firm in the set-aside portion of the auction that was
‘‘controlled’’ by a firm with assets in excess of $500 million or annual revenues in excess of $125 million. This
control standard was intended once again to promote
diversity among wireless carriers and to increase competition after the auction, while allowing small carriers to
gain improved access to investment capital from larger
telecommunications firms. Certain large carriers, however, evaded this control standard and gained access to
the set-aside spectrum by creating companies that were
(for all practical purposes) under their control.
For example, AT&T Wireless, a firm with assets of
$43.0 billion (86 times the FCC’s limit) and operating
revenues of $6.6 billion (53 times the FCC’s limit) in the
summer before the auction began, 48 gained access to the
closed auction through the creation of a company called
‘‘Alaska Native’’. 49 According to Alaska Native’s bidding
application filed at the FCC in November 2000, AT&T
Wireless owned 38.2 per cent of the equity of Alaska
Native plus debt that was convertible to another 41.2 per
cent of the company’s equity. 50 Alaska Native was the
dominant bidder in the set-aside auction. It won approximately 36 per cent of the set-aside licenses on a population-weighted basis, and approximately 50 per cent of
the set-aside licenses on a value-weighted basis. 51
Nextwave sued the FCC for violating the bankruptcy laws in response to the Commission’s re-auction
of its spectrum, but the Supreme Court decided in January 2003 that the FCC did not have the authority to
supersede the Bankruptcy Court in its role as creditor to
Nextwave. 52 As a result of the court challenge, the FCC
was forced to negate its 2000 re-auction of the spectrum
that Nextwave claimed. Thus, for more than six years
(1996 through 2003), a significant share (30 MHz of
170 MHz of cellular and PCS licenses) of the total spectrum available to U.S. wireless carriers went unused in
some geographic areas, and the U.S. Treasury was unable
to collect Nextwave’s winning bids.
The Cost of the Asymmetry
The FCC’s asymmetric treatment of wireless carriers
distorts investment decisions of both incumbent carriers
and new entrants. Large wireless carriers that would otherwise have paid full price for spectrum have been
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encouraged to disguise themselves as small firms to win
valuable discounts. In a study of the price effects of the
set-aside program in Auction #35, Professor Peter
Cramton of the University of Maryland, Dr. Allan
Ingraham, and one of the authors of this report found
that, had Alaska Native pursued its objectives in the
open auction, Alaska Native would have won fewer
licenses and would have paid significantly more for
those licenses that it won. 53 Hence, the FCC’s set-aside
system potentially cost the government substantial revenues in the non-set-aside auction.
Although wireless consumers do not care about the
financial might of their wireless operator, they do value
the quality of service, range of wireless options, and price.
If set-aside policies succeed in placing spectrum in the
hands of small, inexperienced owners, such as Nextwave,
they do little to contribute to the quality of wireless
service, which can only be efficiently offered by large
national carriers. Eventually, the winning bidders in a
‘‘set-aside’’ auction must either sell their spectrum to
these experienced national carriers or contract with the
national carriers to provide the wireless service. 54 In the
case of Nextwave, however, the asymmetric bidding
policy not only failed to achieve its stated objectives, but
also deprived consumers of the competition that would
have resulted from the productive use of the spectrum
that Nextwave obtained in the auction.

Asymmetric Rules for Broadband Service
Providers
U.S. regulatory policy has also created an unlevel
playing field in the broadband Internet access market.
Despite the fact that cable modem providers account for
three-quarters of all residential broadband customers in
the United States, the FCC continues to regulate DSL
providers as if they were dominant carriers under the
Telecommunications Act.
The Nature of the Asymmetry
The United States regulates DSL services provided
by incumbent telephone carriers under the provisions of
the 1996 Telecommunications Act that govern
unbundling and interconnection. Cable modem services,
on the other hand, are subject to considerably less regulation because they were developed by companies that
are regulated under different provisions of the U.S. Communications Act . 55 The regulations imposed upon
incumbent telephone companies have restricted their
ability to compete in the broadband market with the
unregulated cable companies. 56
The FCC’s treatment of the Regional Bell Companies (RBOCs), the major providers of DSL service, is
discriminatory in a number of ways. First, the RBOCs
have been excluded from the core backbone market
until recently due to the line-of-business restrictions in
the 1982 AT&T antitrust decree and similar restrictions
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that were carried over into the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 57 Second, the RBOCs are not permitted to
manufacture equipment used on customer premises. 58
Therefore, unlike cable providers such as AT&T (now
Comcast), the RBOCs cannot collaborate with equipment vendors. Third, the Telecommunications Act
requires RBOCs to unbundle their network facilities 59 at
rates that have so far been based on the forward-looking
costs of providing them. 60 Furthermore, the FCC has
extended unbundling requirements to high-speed
Internet services and has compelled the RBOCs to
unbundle the ‘‘spectrum’’ within existing local loops — a
regulation that is now being vacated. Fifth, until recently,
RBOCs were barred from providing interLATA (local
access and transport area) services, 61 which prevented
them from creating ‘‘regional centered points of presence
that would allow them to take advantage of economies
of scale in data service.’’ 62
These diverse forms of regulation of the RBOCs do
not apply to cable providers’ offerings of cable modem
service. As a result of this asymmetry, competition
between incumbent telephone providers and cable companies in the broadband Internet access market is not as
effective as it could otherwise be.
The Cost of the Asymmetry
As of June 2003, the RBOCs’ share of the residential
and small business broadband Internet access market
was roughly 30 per cent — slightly more than half of
AT&T’s share of the U.S. interstate long distance market
when the FCC declared AT&T to be non-dominant. 63
Incumbent telephone companies, by contrast, are still
unable to reach as many subscribers with DSL as cable
companies can reach with cable modem services. This
imbalance is not surprising. Because cable companies do
not have to provide entrants with access to their facilities,
they have a much stronger incentive to invest in the
system upgrades needed to deliver broadband service.
The incumbent telephone companies have been much
less willing to invest the necessary capital to extend fibre
and electronics out into their networks so that they can
provide DSL service. Their reluctance is understandable
given the asymmetric regulatory requirements that they
share much of these improved facilities with rivals at
cost-based rates.
DSL providers would be able to compete more
effectively against cable modem providers if the FCC
were to free the RBOCs from the requirement to lease
their new broadband facilities to competitors at regulated, cost-based rates. The beneficiaries of such a move
would be consumers, who would likely experience lower
prices for broadband connections. Moreover, consumers
who are not yet able to receive DSL service would experience greater choice if RBOCs were assured that their
incremental investment to upgrade the copper loops in
these areas would not be appropriated by rivals.
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IV. Economic Considerations in the
Canadian Foreign Ownership
Debate

T

he asymmetric rules designed by U.S. regulators to
encourage investment by new local entrants have
resulted in a large amount of wasteful investment.
Although these asymmetric rules helped to increase the
annual growth rate in capital spending between 1995
and 2001 from five per cent per year to 20 per cent per
year, capital spending has since collapsed to less than its
1995 level. Competition in telecommunications is settling into platform competition among incumbent carriers, perhaps one or two ‘‘long distance’’ companies,
cable companies, wireless providers, and satellite companies.
The lessons from two other examples of asymmetric
regulation in the United States are also relevant to the
issues raised by Industry Canada. In particular, the U.S.
experience with broadband regulation and foreign ownership restrictions on wireless carriers suggests that there
is a very real danger that Industry Canada’s two proposals, tiering and licensing, will provide disincentives
for investment in Canadian infrastructure.

A Tiering Approach for Foreign
Investment Restrictions
Establishing ‘‘tiers’’ of Canadian carriers eligible to
attract foreign capital would not be in the public interest.
If we assume that foreign-capital restrictions raise the
relative cost of capital for Canadian carriers, imposing
such restrictions on incumbents would decrease their
incentive to invest in network upgrades or new services.
This asymmetry would tilt the market towards the carriers eligible for foreign capital infusions even if those
carriers were less efficient or less able to invest and
develop new services and facilities. In addition, such
restrictions might cause difficulty for Canada under its
trade agreements with other countries.
Tiering Would Reduce the Incentives of
Incumbent Carriers to Invest in Network
Upgrades or New Services
We begin by assuming that allowing all Canadian
carriers unfettered access to foreign capital would reduce
their cost of capital. If this assumption were not true,
there would appear to be little reason to address the
foreign-capital restriction at this time. Any attempt to
allow a favoured class of Canadian carriers access to foreign capital while denying the incumbents comparable
access would result in diminished investment incentives
for the incumbents. Denying incumbents access to foreign capital would raise their cost of capital relative to
that of their rivals. This discrepancy in the cost of capital
would place incumbent carriers at a competitive disad-

28
vantage vis-à-vis entrants. The lower cost of capital would
allow entrants to take greater risks on new technologies
and would enable them to price their services at lower
costs. In an integrated global economy, the supply of
capital for telecommunications is likely to be relatively
elastic. 64 It is not surprising, therefore, that the imposition of barriers to foreign ownership by other nations
has resulted in large reductions in foreign investment. 65
If shareholders perceived that the restricted companies
were at a competitive disadvantage, tiering could lower
the restricted companies share prices, and therefore, actually increase their cost of capital.
Tiering Could Aggravate the Problem of Excess
Capacity
Another problem with tiering is that it would distort the investment decisions of foreign carriers looking
to invest in Canada. Foreign investment that would otherwise go to an incumbent would now be steered to an
entrant. This additional investment could lead to
wasteful infrastructure investments, as occurred in the
United States in the late 1990s. If excessive new capacity
were built, as in the United States, the value of existing
networks would decline. To fill excess capacity from the
telecommunications networks, carriers would be forced
to cut prices, precipitating exit from the industry.
For an historical analogy, Industry Canada should
consider the period of 2000–2002 in the U.S. telecommunications industry. After recognizing the extent of
excess capacity in long distance networks, created in part
by the easy access to capital for fibre-optic networks and
the asymmetrical ban of RBOC participation in this
market, the market value of these long-distance carriers
declined severely. Broadwing, Global Crossing, ICG,
Level 3, McLeod, Touch America, WorldCom, XO Communications and several other notable long distance,
fibre-optic network operators greatly scaled back their
operations or filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy during
this period.
As we discussed in an earlier section, asymmetric
rules designed to encourage investment by U.S. CLECs
also contributed to the inefficient investment of roughly
$40 billion between 1996 and 2001. 66 Between 1987
and 1996, nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) capital
spending by telecommunications carriers increased at
average rates of 4.8 and 4.5 per cent per year, respectively.
After the asymmetric rules were imposed, the growth
rate over the next four years soared to more than 20 per
cent annually. The asymmetric rules in the United States
helped to accelerate capital spending by roughly 15 per
cent by encouraging the entry of scores of new entrants,
many of which lacked sound business plans. Were a
similar acceleration to occur in Canada with the same
results, $1.155 billion per year (equal to 15 per cent of
the $7.7 billion in capital spending in 2001) could be
wasted. 67 There is no reason to believe that Canadian
entrants would use their favourable status any more effi-
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ciently than U.S. firms have used the FCC’s favourable
rules.
Objective Measures To Establish Restricted
Companies is Difficult
Assuming that Industry Canada were to pursue
asymmetric regulations, it would be very difficult to provide an objective standard for determining which carriers should be relieved of foreign ownership restrictions
and which ones should remain subject to them. The
criteria for restricting investment in a company could be
based on objective measures, such as financial
benchmarks or market share, or purely subjective factors.
The investment criteria could be based on the type
of platform, as is the case in the United States where
wireline carriers are not subject to the foreign capital
restriction imposed on wireless carriers. However, as
alternative platforms are increasingly competing in the
same product market — namely, voice and data services
— it is not reasonable to give an artificial advantage to
one platform over another.
Finally, large Canadian carriers might create separate subsidiaries to perform research and product development or to offer new services. Would these subsidiaries be eligible for foreign capital infusions? If the
subsidiaries were considered to be under the control of
the restricted carrier, then these firms might move all
research and product development activities outside of
Canada where the restrictions would not apply. To
understand how far a carrier might go to avoid these
rules (or game the system), Industry Canada should
review the U.S. experiment in creating designated entities for wireless services. 68
Tiering Would Not Add to the Competitive
Process
As discussed above, there is a trend in U.S. telecommunications toward platform competition between
incumbent carriers, perhaps one or two ‘‘long distance’’
companies, cable companies, wireless providers, and satellite companies. A small number of new facilities-based
local carriers add marginally to this competition. Entry
promotes consumers’ welfare only to the extent that new
carriers can discipline the incumbents’ prices, stimulate
the incumbents to upgrade their offerings, or provide
new and innovative services themselves. In the United
States, the new carriers have not been successful in any
of these respects. To the extent that incumbents are
lowering prices (DSL prices are falling) and offering new
services (3G wireless services), it would appear that they
are reacting to the competitive offerings of facilitiesbased wireline carriers and other operators using alternative platforms, rather than to the derivative offerings of
small, financially-troubled entrants. Moreover, those
entrants have not been successful in introducing new
services.
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A Licensing Approach for Foreign
Investment Restrictions

Asymmetric Regulation of Foreign
Investment in Australia and Korea

Industry Canada is also considering whether foreign
investment restrictions should be replaced with a
licensing approach. Currently, only providers of international telecommunications services are licensed. Under
the new approach, there would be no ownership restrictions, but mergers and acquisitions would be examined
on a case-by-case basis.
A licensing regime would risk creating new uncertainty for operators by subjecting them to new or
changed conditions at the discretion of the regulator. In
addition, the creation of new public policy burdens
could reduce access to capital and increase the cost of
capital for the whole industry. For example, a new
licensing condition might require a head office in
Canada, the investment of a certain amount each year in
rural broadband deployment, or other service requirements. As such, it could have a chilling effect on investment in the industry that would outweigh any benefits
associated with the liberalization of the current ownership rules. Moreover, a licensing approach would inject a
political element into the investment calculus that might
further retard foreign investment.

Asymmetric regulation of foreign investment has
proven to be ineffective in Australia and Korea. In Australia, the government maintains a 35 per cent foreign
ownership limitation in Telstra, the incumbent provider,
but it allows foreign ownership of 100 per cent in other
facilities-based carriers. 71 In 1997, the Korean government maintained a 20 per cent foreign ownership limitation for Korean Telecom (KT), the incumbent provider,
but raised the foreign ownership limit to 33 per cent for
other facilities-based carriers. 72 In 1998, the Korean government raised the foreign ownership for KT to 33 per
cent, 73 thus ending the asymmetry for a short period of
time until July 1999, when the government relaxed the
foreign ownership restrictions on other facilities-based
carriers to 49 per cent. 74 Finally, in August 2002, the
government raised the limit for KT to 49 per cent, eliminating the asymmetry once again. 75

Licensing Would Reduce Foreign Investment
The uncertainty created by a more discretionary
administrative process could have a negative impact on
capital investment from both Canadian and foreign
sources. In particular, foreign investors would likely be
less willing to invest in an environment in which the
conditions for obtaining licenses is discretionary and
therefore subject to political considerations. 69 For most
international carriers, the size of the U.S. telecommunications market makes it sufficiently attractive to overcome
regulatory impediments. Given Canada’s much smaller
market and the global competition for investment, foreign investors are less likely to look to Canada if they
believe there is any possibility their investment will be
subject to delay or special conditions as a result of a
licensing regime.
Licensing Would Subject Foreign Carriers to
Political Pressures
A licensing regime essentially constitutes a case-bycase evaluation of each entity and its foreign investment
transactions. Such a process inefficiently imposes compliance costs on carriers and introduces the possibility of an
asymmetric application of rules from one company to
another over time. The potential for such a process to be
overly politicized would be significant, particularly if
larger Canadian companies were involved in transactions. There is a strong possibility that the overall
licensing and approval process would be highly subjective and opaque, which would ultimately damage the
overall investment climate for Canadian telecommunications. 70

Financial data suggest that the asymmetric regulation of foreign ownership in Korea harmed shareholders
of the incumbent carrier. When KT announced its campaign to raise the foreign ownership ceiling to 49 per
cent, its share price increased 10 per cent. 76 Analysts
stated that KT’s valuation had suffered because of the
imbalance between supply and demand of foreign capital. 77 They reasoned that with the foreign ownership
ceiling raised, potential demand from foreign investors
would increase KT’s share price. 78
Extending asymmetric regulatory advantages to a
particular class of competitors is not likely to alter the
long-term equilibrium market structure if these companies are not viable for a variety of economic reasons. A
few large players dominate the telecommunications
market in Australia and Korea — despite the favourable
investment treatment bestowed on non-incumbent carriers. 79 In Australia, there are two large wireline providers
(Telstra and Optus) and three major wireless providers
(Telstra, Optus, and Vodafone). Competition has developed slowly in the local services market; Telstra controls
95 per cent of the local fixed services market. Furthermore, Australia’s broadband penetration rate of 1.5 per
cent trails most industrialized nations. 80
In Korea, the story is much the same. There are four
large wireline providers (Korean Telecom, Hanaro,
Dacom, and Onse) and three wireless providers (KT
FreeTel, SK Telecom, and LG Telecom). 81 Although
Korea is among the world’s leaders in broadband penetration (an accomplishment not owing to any foreign
ownership policy), Korean Telecom still controls 95 per
cent of the local fixed service market.
The factors that influence long run market structure
— economies of scale and scope, demographics, and
market technologies — are likely to be much more
important than differential access to foreign capital in
relatively large, wealthy countries. The persistent failure
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of policies in other countries that target certain classes of
competitors should serve as a warning to Canada as it
contemplates making foreign capital available only to
new entrants. Despite attempts to encourage competition through tiering, the market structure of telecommunications in Australia and Korea has not changed significantly since asymmetric regulation was imposed.

V. Conclusion

B

y conferring an advantage on one carrier over
another, a regulator believes that it can direct
resources to more efficient deployment than can the free
market. Even in the rare case of market failure or a
perceived lack of competition (which has not been established in Canada’s case), asymmetric regulation intended
to confer an advantage on a privileged class of carriers is
likely to do more harm than good. Skewing the regulatory environment distorts the carriers’ choices — rather
than maximizing their private interests, the carriers
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choose the politically desirable path and often fail to
satisfy either objective. Moreover, carriers waste vast
resources to convince the regulator that they are in fact
complying with its objectives.
Industry Canada should not attempt to bestow preferential treatment on particular firms or particular platforms. Wireless systems should not be promoted over
satellite delivery. Cable telephony should not be promoted over fibre or copper delivery. Small wireline competitors should not be given capital-cost advantages over
their larger rivals. Giving one platform technology or one
set of firms an artificial advantage is likely to distort the
allocation of market resources if it succeeds, and to be
even more wasteful of society’s scarce resources if it does
not. In either case, the result is adverse to the interests of
Canadian consumers. Unless there is strong evidence of
market failure, Industry Canada should trust the
market’s choices. If Industry Canada has any reservations
about exercising such restraint, it can simply look to the
failed experiences of its neighbour to the south.
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